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# What Problem Is Your Shareholder Liquidity Event Solving?
- URL: https://www.theinvestornarrative.com/what-problem-is-your-liquidity-event-solving/
- Published: 2026-11-17T14:37:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-19T14:27:31.000Z
- Description: A liquidity transaction can provide cash without resolving the underlying problem. The Liquidity Decision Test gives founders, boards, and investors a framework to assess whether a transaction solved a problem, built a bridge, or deferred a decision.
- Author: Tom Krutilek
- Tags: Lead Analysis

*The Liquidity Decision Test: How founders, boards, and investors in a private company can assess a transaction's purpose, terms, and consequences.*

A liquidity transaction can address one shareholder's immediate need while leaving others exposed to unresolved risks.

An employee may finally be able to sell shares. A founder may gain financial flexibility. An investor may receive cash after years of waiting. Yet the company can remain exposed to the same financing pressures, valuation uncertainty, or difficult exit prospects.

These distinctions matter as private companies face growing pressure to provide liquidity—a way for shareholders to turn some of their ownership into cash.

In Morgan Stanley's [*2026 Liquidity Trends Report*](https://www.morganstanley.com/atwork/articles/liquidity-trends-report?ref=theinvestornarrative.com), 88% of the growth- and late-stage private company executives surveyed said they felt pressure to facilitate a liquidity event. [Carta's research](https://carta.com/data/vc-fund-performance-q1-2025/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com) reveals the challenge from the investor side: by the end of the first quarter of 2025, only 37% of U.S. venture funds established in 2019 and 30% of those established in 2020 had returned any cash to their investors.

Private companies now have more ways to provide liquidity. But completing a transaction is not the same as resolving the problem that created the demand.

A *tender offer* may allow employees to sell some shares while early investors continue waiting for an exit. A *continuation vehicle* may give some investors cash while others choose to remain invested for several more years.

*Both transactions can be entirely reasonable. The question is how to judge them—before they happen and afterward.*

## **In brief**

- **Start with the purpose.** Employee retention and recruiting, equity or tax deadlines, investor pressure for cash, founder liquidity, ownership and control, and staying private longer are different motivations for seeking liquidity. Each requires its own test of success.
- **Evaluate purpose, terms, and consequences.** What problem is the transaction intended to solve? Who receives cash, and who retains the risk? What actually changes afterward?
- **Separate the decision from the outcome.** Providing liquidity does not necessarily improve the business. Business growth does not guarantee better shareholder returns. And a reasonable decision can still produce a disappointing result.

*This is the third article in a series on the fast-changing private capital market. The first,* [*The Fast-Changing Private Capital Market: More Options, Harder Choices*](https://www.theinvestornarrative.com/private-capital-market-more-options-harder-choices/)*, showed that financing, liquidity, and exit no longer have to happen together. The second,* [*The Three Private Markets: Which One Is Your Company Really In?*](https://www.theinvestornarrative.com/three-private-markets/)*, showed that those options are not equally available to every company. This article introduces a framework for evaluating why companies and shareholders seek liquidity, how transactions address those needs, and what the consequences reveal for those who sell and those who remain invested.*

---

## **Why Liquidity—and Why Now?**

Six common reasons help explain why companies and shareholders seek private liquidity:

- **Employee retention and recruiting:** Providing opportunities to turn equity compensation into cash, helping employees see tangible value in remaining with or joining the company.
- **Equity or tax deadlines:** Addressing expiring equity awards or tax obligations that can arise before employees have an opportunity to sell their shares.
- **Investor pressure for cash:** Allowing venture and private equity funds to return capital to their investors rather than relying solely on unrealized investment gains.
- **Founder liquidity:** Allowing founders to diversify some of their personal wealth while continuing to build the company.
- **Ownership and control:** Managing shareholder turnover, controlling how shares change hands, and maintaining oversight of the company's ownership structure.
- **Staying private longer:** Providing shareholders with some liquidity while the company pursues growth and a potentially more attractive future exit.

The pressure is particularly visible among employees and investors.

On the *employee side*, Carta recorded a record 16,538 employees selling shares through tender offers administered on its platform in 2025\. A *tender offer* is an organized opportunity for eligible shareholders—including employees, founders, or investors—to sell shares at a specified price. Yet those employee participants represented only a small proportion of the roughly one million employees on Carta's platform. Private-company liquidity is expanding, but access remains selective.

On the *investor side*, distributions to private equity fund investors averaged 13% of net asset value during 2022–2024, compared with a historical average of 28%, according to the [*Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst Association (CAIA)*](https://caia.org/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com). In other words, investors received substantially less cash relative to the reported value of their fund investments than they had historically.

Institutional investors may face particularly strong liquidity pressures when funds approach the end of their planned investment periods or their own investors expect cash distributions. These pressures can influence the timing of a proposed sale, even when the company might benefit from remaining privately held longer. *That creates an important question for boards: whose need for liquidity is driving the transaction, and how does it align with the interests of the company and other shareholders?*

Timing matters as much as motivation. For example, equity awards may be approaching expiration, a fund may be nearing the end of its planned life, or employees may be leaving with vested shares. A planned sale or IPO may have fallen through, or a financing round may create an opportunity for existing shareholders to sell alongside new investment.

These motivations are not interchangeable. A transaction that addresses an employee's immediate need may do little for an investor seeking a full exit. A transaction that allows a company to remain private longer may still leave shareholders exposed to the same financing and valuation risks.

The first question is not simply whether shareholders can be provided with liquidity. *It is why liquidity is needed, whose financial needs the transaction is intended to address, and what makes providing that liquidity necessary now.*

> ***A liquidity transaction should be judged not only by the cash it provides, but by the problem it is intended to solve.***

## **The Liquidity Decision Test**

A liquidity transaction can be evaluated in three stages: its *purpose*, its *terms,* and its *consequences*. The first two help determine whether the decision is reasonable before the transaction closes. The third compares what was expected to happen with what actually happened.

![Liquidity Decision Test framework showing three stages—Purpose, Terms, and Consequences—and three possible outcomes: solving a problem, building a bridge, or deferring a decision.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/cb/6f/cb6ffcb0-463e-4f7a-b726-8a6a6bfe065e/content/images/2026/11/data-src-image-cb7dc93a-a031-4453-80fa-8026a6dd9b93.png)

1. **Purpose:** Why are we doing this? What problem are we solving, whose problem is it, and why now? The answer establishes what success should look like.
2. **Terms:** Is this the right transaction? Who receives cash, who retains the risk, at what price, and through what process? Were other alternatives, including waiting, seriously considered?
3. **Consequences:** What actually changed? What improvements were expected, by when, and what happened? Which problems were resolved, and what risks remain?

Together, the three stages help determine whether a transaction solved a defined problem, created a productive bridge to a better outcome, or merely postponed a difficult decision.

These outcomes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A transaction may address an employee's immediate liquidity need while leaving other shareholders exposed to unresolved risks. The assessment must therefore consider whose interests were served, how their exposure changed, and what remained unresolved.

The framework also separates two questions that are often confused: *Was the decision reasonable, given what was known at the time? And did it ultimately produce a favorable outcome?*

A reasonable decision can lead to a disappointing outcome. A poorly supported decision can benefit from favorable circumstances. Neither result, by itself, establishes whether the original judgment was sound.

The following examples show how the Liquidity Decision Test applies in practice. Each highlights a different stage: Stripe illustrates the importance of a clearly defined purpose; Hopin and continuation vehicles demonstrate why transaction terms and investor choices matter; and Figma shows why the eventual consequences must be evaluated separately from the original decision.

## **Stage 1: Purpose**

*A well-defined purpose addresses a problem that can be identified, measured, and tied to a deadline.* [Stripe's](https://stripe.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com) 2023 financing illustrates why that matters.

Many Stripe employees held restricted stock units (RSUs), a form of equity compensation. Their awards required both a period of service and a qualifying event, such as an IPO, before employees could receive their shares. As deadlines on some early employee awards approached, Stripe faced a difficult choice: remain private and risk losing the awards, or settle them without an IPO and create substantial tax obligations for employees who could not readily sell their shares. According to [Bloomberg's March 2023 reporting](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/capital-markets/stripe-details-3-5-billion-tax-bill-in-latest-fundraising-round?ref=theinvestornarrative.com), the potential tax obligations totaled approximately $3.5 billion.

To address this, in March 2023, Stripe raised more than $6.5 billion at a $50 billion valuation, substantially below its $95 billion valuation in 2021\. The company said the financing would provide liquidity to current and former employees and address withholding taxes associated with their equity awards. Stripe also made clear that it did not need the capital to operate its business. The transaction included the retirement of existing shares to offset the issuance of new shares to investors.

**Stripe illustrates the *purpose stage* of the Liquidity Decision Test.** The problem was identifiable: approaching employee-equity deadlines and substantial potential tax obligations. The financing had a specific objective and addressed those needs without requiring the company to go public. That made it possible to evaluate the transaction against the problem it was designed to solve.

The lower valuation reflected broader market conditions, not simply a decision to prioritize employee liquidity. But Stripe addressed a defined problem rather than waiting for its previous valuation to become achievable again.

Stripe subsequently reached a $159 billion valuation in a February 2026 employee tender offer. That recovery does not establish that the 2023 financing caused the increase or that the transaction was costless. It does show that resolving the immediate liquidity problem did not prevent Stripe from achieving a substantially higher valuation later.

> ***Solving a defined problem can matter more than preserving a historical valuation.***

## **Stage 2: Terms**

A clear purpose is not enough. *The terms of a liquidity transaction determine who receives cash, who remains invested, and how the risks are distributed.* Two examples show why this stage deserves as much attention as the first.

### **Hopin: Who sells, and who stays?**

[Hopin](https://hopin.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com) was a virtual-events company that grew rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic, when businesses turned to online conferences and meetings. Investor enthusiasm helped propel its valuation to $7.75 billion in 2021.

During the company's rapid expansion, founder Johnny Boufarhat sold approximately $195 million of his shares through *secondary transactions*—sales of existing shares to investors rather than new shares issued by the company. These sales represented only part of his ownership. Bloomberg reported that he still held approximately 40% of Hopin in 2021 following earlier share sales.

But Hopin's fortunes changed as in-person events returned and demand for virtual gatherings weakened. In 2023, the company sold its core events business to [RingCentral](https://www.ringcentral.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com). The remaining business was valued at approximately $400 million, a fraction of its earlier valuation. Hopin planned to use proceeds from the sale and existing cash to provide liquidity to its venture investors. According to Axios, investors who participated in its Series B and later financing rounds were expected to recover approximately half of their original investments.

The sale also illustrates how a company can generate cash through the disposal of part of its business and then use those proceeds to provide shareholder liquidity. The two decisions are related but distinct: selling an operating asset generates cash for the company, while distributing that cash to shareholders addresses their need for liquidity. Both decisions require an assessment of their purpose, terms, and consequences.

There is no evidence that Boufarhat's earlier share sales caused the company's decline. But those transactions changed his financial exposure. He realized substantial cash proceeds while retaining an ownership interest, whereas other shareholders had different opportunities to reduce their exposure.

**Hopin illustrates the *terms stage* of the Liquidity Decision Test.** The important question is not simply who received liquidity, but how much risk each shareholder transferred, how much remained, and on what terms. A partial sale can materially reduce a shareholder's financial exposure without eliminating it.

> ***A liquidity transaction can solve one shareholder's problem while leaving another exposed to the same risks.***

### **Continuation vehicles: When process matters as much as price**

Investor pressure for cash helps explain the growing use of continuation vehicles in private equity. A *continuation vehicle* is a new investment fund or structure that acquires one or more companies from an older fund, often under the same manager. Investors in the original fund can generally choose to receive cash or continue holding an investment through the new vehicle.

These transactions have become an important source of private-market liquidity. According to the [*Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst Association (CAIA)*](https://caia.org/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com), fund-manager-led secondary transactions reached approximately $115 billion in 2025, with continuation vehicles accounting for 89% of that activity.

Continuation vehicles can serve an important and legitimate purpose. They allow some investors to receive cash while others remain invested in businesses that may benefit from additional time to grow or pursue an eventual exit.

But they also create an inherent conflict: the same fund manager controls the selling fund and manages the vehicle acquiring its assets. That makes the transaction process particularly important. How was the price established? Were competing bids or other alternatives considered? And did investors receive enough information and time to decide whether to sell or remain invested?

In October 2026, the [*Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA)*](https://ilpa.org/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com), which represents investors in private capital funds, published updated guidance emphasizing transparent conflict management, defensible pricing, and informed investor decisions. The guidance recognizes that different transactions may require different approaches, but *the underlying principle is consistent: investors need confidence that the process and terms are reasonable.*

*Continuation vehicles demonstrate another dimension of the terms stage.* Even when the eventual investment outcome remains uncertain, investors can assess whether the pricing process was credible, reasonable alternatives were considered, and potential conflicts were appropriately managed.

Liquidity transactions can also serve an ownership-management purpose. For example, a company-organized tender offer may provide shareholders with a controlled opportunity to sell while allowing the company to manage who acquires its shares. The terms therefore matter not only for the cash received, but also for the ownership structure that remains afterward.

## **Stage 3: Consequences**

A shareholder liquidity transaction can address an immediate financial need while also affecting the company's financing, ownership, and longer-term strategy. The third stage evaluates whether the transaction achieved its intended purpose and what consequences followed for both the company and its shareholders.

For management and the board, that means examining whether the transaction strengthened employee retention, preserved financial flexibility, supported the company's strategy, or improved its prospects for a future exit. Where a liquidity arrangement also involves raising new capital or selling company assets, the assessment should consider whether the proceeds were necessary, appropriately sized, and used as intended.

For shareholders, the assessment considers who received cash, who remained invested, and how their financial exposure and potential returns changed.

[Figma](https://www.figma.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com), the collaborative design software company, illustrates one important dimension of this assessment: *why business performance and shareholder investment outcomes must be evaluated separately*.

In 2022, [Adobe](https://www.adobe.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com) agreed to acquire Figma for approximately $20 billion in cash and stock. The deal collapsed in December 2023 after regulatory scrutiny, leaving Figma independent. In July 2024, Figma provided employees and investors an opportunity to sell shares through a $567 million tender offer at a $12.5 billion valuation, without waiting for another acquisition or an IPO. A year later, Figma went public at a valuation of approximately $19 billion.

Figma has continued to grow. In the third quarter of 2026, revenue increased 43% from a year earlier to approximately $391 million, and the company generated about $42 million in free cash flow.

But business growth did not produce a higher valuation for every shareholder. By November 10, 2026, Figma's public-market valuation had fallen below the valuation used in its 2024 tender offer. Those who sold in 2024 received a known price, while those who remained invested continued to face changing market valuations.

**Figma illustrates the *consequences stage* of the Liquidity Decision Test.** The company provided shareholder liquidity, remained independent long enough to complete an IPO, and continued growing its business. These were meaningful developments for the company. Yet the subsequent decline in its public-market valuation illustrates why achieving strategic objectives and generating attractive shareholder returns are not necessarily the same thing.

*The assessment must therefore consider both what the transaction accomplished for the company and how it affected shareholders.* In Figma's case, employees and investors who sold in 2024 received liquidity at a known price, while those who remained invested retained the opportunity for future gains alongside the risk of changing market valuations. Their eventual investment returns remain uncertain.

> ***A business can grow while shareholders who remain invested see the value of their holdings decline.***

## **When More Time Does Not Guarantee More Value**

The consequences of waiting also matter in private equity. Newer arrangements, sometimes called *CV-squared transactions*, move an investment from one continuation vehicle into another managed by the same firm. [Raymond James](https://www.raymondjames.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com) has described this emerging structure as turning a one-time liquidity solution into a repeatable ownership model.

These transactions can serve a legitimate purpose. They may provide additional liquidity to some investors while allowing others to remain invested in a business with further growth potential. But a second continuation transaction should be evaluated against the expectations established for the first. What improvements were anticipated, which were achieved, and what new evidence supports extending the investment period again?

*Venture-backed companies* face a similar challenge. [Airtable](https://www.airtable.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com), a platform for organizing business data and workflows, and [Miro](https://miro.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com), an online collaboration platform, continued operating as substantial businesses after reaching peak private valuations in 2021–2022\. Both were acquired by [Bending Spoons](https://bendingspoons.com/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com) in 2026 at equity values approximately 81% and 90% below their respective earlier financing valuations.

*Airtable and Miro illustrate an important limitation of judging decisions through hindsight.* Their eventual acquisition valuations were substantially below earlier financing valuations, but those outcomes alone do not establish that waiting was unreasonable or that the additional time caused the decline in value. Additional time may create opportunities for business improvement, but it does not guarantee a sale at or above the company's previous valuation.

> ***More time can create opportunity. But it does not guarantee greater value for investors.***

## **Reaching an Assessment: Solve, Bridge, or Defer?**

With purpose, terms, and consequences in view, the *Liquidity Decision Test* provides a way to assess what a transaction actually accomplished. Three outcomes are possible:

- **It solved a problem** when the specific need the transaction was intended to address was met on reasonable terms. Stripe's 2023 financing illustrates this outcome: it addressed a defined employee-equity problem without requiring the company to go public. Resolving that immediate need did not eliminate every future liquidity challenge.
- **It built a bridge** when the additional time helped a company make measurable progress toward a better outcome. Figma provided shareholder liquidity, continued growing, and eventually completed an IPO. Yet its subsequent public-market valuation demonstrates why reaching a strategic milestone and producing attractive shareholder returns must be evaluated separately.
- **It deferred the problem** when a transaction postponed a difficult decision without sufficient progress toward resolving the underlying issue. Repeated investment extensions, limited operating progress, and increasingly difficult financing or exit alternatives can be warning signs. The emergence of CV-squared transactions makes this question particularly relevant: what has changed to justify extending the investment period again?

These assessments are not mutually exclusive. A tender offer may address an employee's immediate liquidity need, give management additional time to pursue an IPO, and leave early investors facing uncertainty about their eventual returns. The same transaction can therefore solve one problem while leaving another unresolved.

Nor does an unfavorable outcome necessarily mean the original decision was wrong. Deferral may become apparent only over time, and repeated extensions or disappointing results do not establish that waiting was unreasonable when the decision was made. The assessment must distinguish what was known at the time from what became apparent afterward.

*The market a company operates in also shapes its choices.* *Trophy Market* companies generally have more persistent buyer demand and greater flexibility over when and how shareholders obtain liquidity. *Structured Market* companies often depend on negotiated, company-organized transactions. *Thin Market* companies may have few credible buyers, making additional delays particularly consequential when operating progress fails to improve their financing or exit prospects.

The reasons for seeking liquidity may be similar across all three markets. What differs is the availability of buyers, the alternatives shareholders can realistically pursue, and the potential cost of waiting. Those differences also shape how founders, boards, and shareholders evaluate the same transaction.

## **One Transaction, Three Perspectives**

Founders, boards, and shareholders can apply the same Liquidity Decision Test and reach different conclusions. Their interests may overlap, but their responsibilities, objectives, and measures of success are not necessarily the same.

**Founder/CEO.** Management must determine whether providing liquidity supports the company's strategy—retaining key employees, maintaining financial flexibility, and sustaining growth. The question is what the transaction is intended to accomplish, whether its terms support that purpose, and how the company will measure progress afterward.

**The Board.** Directors must assess whether the transaction serves a legitimate company purpose, whether reasonable alternatives have been considered, and whether the pricing, process, and treatment of shareholders are appropriate. Their responsibility is to challenge assumptions, evaluate potential conflicts, and ensure that the decision is supported by the available evidence—not simply by expectations of a favorable outcome.

**Selling or remaining shareholder.** Each shareholder must weigh the cash available today against the potential returns, risks, and additional time involved in remaining invested. An employee whose wealth is concentrated in company shares may reach a different conclusion from a diversified institutional investor. Selling some shares can reduce financial exposure while preserving an ownership interest; remaining invested offers the possibility of greater returns, but also continued risk.

The same transaction can therefore be reasonable from different perspectives without producing the same outcome for everyone. *The important question is whether each decision was justified by its purpose, terms, and expected consequences—not whether every stakeholder ultimately received the same benefit.*

## **Liquidity Is Not the Same as Resolution**

Private capital markets now offer more ways to provide liquidity than before. But additional options do not eliminate the underlying questions of valuation, financing, ownership, and eventual exit.

The Liquidity Decision Test does not predict outcomes. It helps founders, boards, and investors distinguish between three things that are often confused:

- Providing liquidity does not necessarily improve the underlying business.
- Business growth does not guarantee better returns for every shareholder.
- A reasonable decision can produce a disappointing outcome, just as a poorly supported decision can benefit from favorable circumstances.

The real test of a liquidity transaction is not simply whether it was completed. It is whether the transaction addressed its intended purpose, whether its pricing and process were reasonable given the available alternatives, and whether its benefits justified the risks and costs involved.

For transactions that extend the investment horizon, the distinction becomes especially important. *Did the additional time produce measurable progress toward a better outcome, or merely postpone a difficult decision?*

A transaction may solve an immediate problem, build a productive bridge, or defer a decision that remains unresolved. It may also produce different outcomes for shareholders who sell and those who remain invested.

For founders, boards, and investors, the challenge ultimately comes down to this:

*If your company provided liquidity in the next 12 months, what specific problem would it solve, who would receive cash and retain risk, and what evidence would demonstrate that the transaction achieved its intended purpose?*

#PrivateMarkets #PrivateCapital #VentureCapital #CorporateGovernance #Secondaries

## **References**

- [Morgan Stanley at Work, "Liquidity Trends Report: Perspectives From Private Company Leaders," 2026.](https://www.morganstanley.com/atwork/articles/liquidity-trends-report?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Carta, "How Long Before VC LPs Get Actual Money Back," March 26, 2025.](https://carta.com/data/linkedin-archive/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Carta, "Startup Tender Offers Hit Record 16K Employees in 2025."](https://carta.com/data/linkedin-archive/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [CAIA, "Continuation Vehicle Boom: Structural Shift or Liquidity Patch?" February 11, 2026.](https://caia.org/blog/2026/02/11/continuation-vehicle-boom-structural-shift-or-liquidity-patch/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Stripe, "Stripe raises Series I to provide employee liquidity," March 15, 2023.](https://stripe.com/newsroom/news/stripe-series-i-employee-liquidity?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [The Irish Times, "Stripe faces $3.3bn tax bill as employees' shares expire," March 6, 2023.](https://www.irishtimes.com/business/2023/03/06/stripe-faces-33-billion-tax-bill-as-employees-shares-expire/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [The Irish Times, "Irish-founded fintech Stripe valued at $159bn," February 24, 2026.](https://www.irishtimes.com/business/2026/02/24/irish-founded-fintech-stripe-valued-at-159bn/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Axios, "Hopin, once valued at $7.6 billion, makes some major changes," August 3, 2023.](https://www.axios.com/2023/08/03/hopin-once-valued-at-76-billion-makes-some-major-changes?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [RingCentral–Hopin transaction announcement.](https://www.ringcentral.com/whyringcentral/company/pressreleases/ringcentral-expands-video-offerings-with-acquisition-of-events-and-session-product-lines-from-hopin.html?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Institutional Limited Partners Association, "Continuation Vehicles: Advancing Alignment Through Best Practices," October 20, 2026.](https://ilpa.org/resources-tools/resource-library/continuation-vehicle-cv-guidance-2026/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Preqin, "Private equity managers double up on continuation vehicles," June 10, 2026.](https://preqin.com/news/private-equity-managers-double-up-on-continuation-vehicles?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Figma, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year 2025 (2024 tender offer results).](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1579878/000162828026009228/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Figma Announces Third Quarter 2026 Financial Results](https://s206.q4cdn.com/973901332/files/content%5Ffiles/Q3%5F26-Figma-Press-Release.pdf?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [StockAnalysis, Figma, Inc. (FIG), closing price November 6, 2026.](https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/fig/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Bending Spoons, "Bending Spoons completes the acquisition of Airtable," September 4, 2026.](https://investors.bendingspoons.com/newsroom/bending-spoons-completes-acquisition-of-airtable?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Bending Spoons has entered into a definitive agreement to acquire Airtable for $1.285 billion, August 4, 2026](https://investors.bendingspoons.com/newsroom/bending-spoons-agrees-to-acquire-airtable?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Bending Spoons, "Bending Spoons enters into a definitive agreement to acquire Miro for $1.355 billion," September 10, 2026.](https://investors.bendingspoons.com/newsroom/bending-spoons-agrees-to-acquire-miro?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)
- [Bending Spoons, "Bending Spoons completes the acquisition of Miro," October 26, 2026.](https://investors.bendingspoons.com/newsroom/bending-spoons-completes-the-acquisition-of-miro?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)

## **About the Author**

*Tom Krutilek is a Board Advisor and Chief Marketing Officer who works with early-stage and growth-stage companies on capital readiness, investor narrative, go-to-market strategy, and AI strategy and governance. His work focuses on a central question: whether growth is truly investable—not just impressive on paper.*

*He helps founders, CEOs, and boards connect commercial performance, capital strategy, and execution to the evidence investors need to underwrite growth. That includes strengthening the investor narrative, identifying gaps in capital readiness, building measurable growth systems, and evaluating where AI can create durable business value and competitive advantage.*

*Tom is also the founder of The Investor Narrative, a publication focused on private capital markets from the perspective of investor readiness. It examines the questions behind the headline numbers—how investors assess growth, capital efficiency, demand quality, competitive advantage, governance, and the assumptions that ultimately determine whether a company is ready for investment capital.*

[Connect with Tom on LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/tom-krutilek/?ref=theinvestornarrative.com)